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Magic tricks usually remain a mystery to the observer. For the sake of science, we offered
participants the opportunity to discover the magician’s secret method by repeatedly
presenting the same trick and asking them to find out how the trick worked. In the
context of insightful problem solving, the present work investigated the emotions that
participants experience upon solving a magic trick. We assumed that these emotions
form the typical “Aha! experience” that accompanies insightful solutions to difficult
problems. We aimed to show that Aha! experiences can be triggered by magic tricks
and to systematically explore the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by breaking it
down into five previously postulated dimensions. 34 video clips of different magic tricks
were presented up to three times to 50 participants who had to find out how the trick
was accomplished, and to indicate whether they had experienced an Aha! during the
solving process. Participants then performed a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative
assessment of their Aha! experiences which was repeated after 14 days to control for its
reliability. 41% of all suggested solutions were accompanied by an Aha! experience. The
quantitative assessment remained stable across time in all five dimensions. Happiness
was rated as the most important dimension. This primacy of positive emotions was also
reflected in participants’ qualitative self-reports which contained more emotional than
cognitive aspects. Implementing magic tricks as problem solving task, we could show
that strong Aha! experiences can be triggered if a trick is solved. We could at least
partially capture the phenomenology of Aha! by identifying one prevailing aspect (positive
emotions), a new aspect (release of tension upon gaining insight into a magic trick) and
one less important aspect (impasse).
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, the solution to a difficult problem pops into mind
suddenly (Davidson, 1995) and unexpectedly (Metcalfe, 1986).
Ever since the Gestalt psychologists (Köhler, 1921; Duncker, 1945;
Wertheimer, 1959) began to investigate problem solving, the phe-
nomenon of insight has been of great interest to psychologists
(Sternberg and Davidson, 1995). Insight is often reported to be
accompanied by an affective response, the “Aha! experience” (e.g.,
Gick and Lockhart, 1995). This is taken as the discriminative cri-
terion to set it apart from analytic and gradual problem solving
(Metcalfe, 1986; Evans, 2008).
Bühler provided the first reports about Aha! experiences,
describing a moment “in which suddenly, the lights come on”
(translated from Bühler, 1907, p. 341). Traditionally, the Aha!
has been regarded as an interesting epiphenomenon of insight
(e.g., Ormerod et al., 2002) or even the defining feature of insight
(Kaplan and Simon, 1990; Gick and Lockhart, 1995) that defies
closer empirical inquiry due to its subjective nature. But the
recent interest in possible neural correlates of insight has led to a
surge in studies that presuppose the subjective Aha! experience to
be the clearest observable aspect of insight (Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004), at least until a better behavioral or even neural marker
of the occurrence of insight is found. Consequently, many of
these studies rely on problem solvers’ subjective reports about the
occurrence of an Aha! experience to classify a solution as insight-
ful and to distinguish it from solutions without insight (Bowden
et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009). However, unsolved questions
remain, especially with regard to methodology.
The methodological difficulties inherent to insight research
have been recognized and discussed in the field (Davidson, 1995,
2003; Chronicle et al., 2004; Ash et al., 2009; Öllinger and
Knoblich, 2009). The debate has revolved around the question
of whether there are specific insight problems and if so, what
defines them. In our opinion, insight problems “per se” don’t exist
(see Öllinger et al., 2013). Any problem can be solved with or
without insight, depending on the problem solver’s prior knowl-
edge. Of course, some problems are more likely to be solved
with insight, like the famous nine-dot problem (Scheerer, 1963).
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When prior knowledge leads to a biased initial problem repre-
sentation (Ohlsson, 1992), a representational change is necessary
to overcome self-imposed constraints resulting in an enhanced
problem representation that might be appropriate to solve the
problem. Unfortunately, the underlying processes of representa-
tional changes are opaque. To deal with this problem, a common
approach is to ask solvers whether they experienced any changes
before a solution occurred. A related unsolved problem is how
to assess the occurrence of insight. A well-known observation
reported by a vast number of participants is the feeling of Aha!
that accompanies the moment of insight. Consequently, each
solution can be classified by asking participants whether they
had or had not experienced an Aha! moment. Bowden and col-
leagues advocate the use of such self-reports (Bowden et al., 2005)
instead of defining a priori what an insight problem is or not.
This means, participants are asked after each solution to report on
their subjective experience of insight, indicated by the Aha! expe-
rience. The problem solver, not the experimenter, decides whether
insight has occurred or not.
We aim at elaborating and differentiating the phenomeno-
logical experience before an insight solution occurs—the pre-
condition to identifying reliable markers that demarcate insight
from non-insight problem solving and for properly understand-
ing the cognitive and neural processes underlying insight problem
solving.
We believe that the self-report approach could help to advance
insight research, if it is possible to show that such reports are
reliable measures, e.g. that they can be repeated over time. We
therefore asked whether participants would be able to remem-
ber their self-reports after a long delay (2 weeks). Of course, the
Aha! experience itself cannot be repeated, only the reports on it.
If the Aha! experience is indeed such a strong affective experi-
ence, we expect people to remember it clearly. This should be
reflected in similar ratings across time, when asked to think back
to their Aha! experiences. Another reason to expect a high reli-
ability is the fact that self-reports have already been successfully
adopted in other studies as a tool to differentiate insight from
non-insight (Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008; Sheth et al.,
2009; Subramaniam et al., 2009). It was even possible to reveal
different neural activity underlying insight and non-insight solu-
tions, for example, Kounios et al. (2006) analyzed a time interval
of 2 s prior to problem presentation and found differences in
neural activity (both in the EEG and in the fMRI signal) pre-
dicting whether the following problem would be solved with
insight (Aha! reported) or without insight (Aha! not reported).
Investigating the memorial advantage of insight, we have also
used participants’ self-reports and found that solutions that had
been classified as insightful were remembered better in compari-
son to non-insight solutions (Danek et al., 2013). In the present
work, we adopted Bowden’s approach (2005) to determine the
occurrence of insight and combined this approach with an a
priori selection of a task (magic tricks) that is likely to trigger
misleading initial problem representations.
Despite its successful use as a solution type classification
criterion and its importance for the interpretation of almost
all neuroscientific studies on insight problem solving, the phe-
nomenology of the Aha! experience, as far as we know, has not
been investigated in more detail. One hindrance is the method-
ological difficulty of its assessment (introspective judgments
about the occurrence of Aha!), another one might be conceptual
problems (what defines an Aha! experience?). So far, there is no
general and explicit agreement on a definition of this concept.
The common denominator is that an Aha! occurs if a solution
suddenly pops into mind. Other aspects like a feeling of sur-
prise, certainty that the solution is correct or a gestalt-like quality
of the solution are stressed or disregarded to various degrees
across studies (Ohlsson, 1992; Bowden et al., 2005; Sandkühler
and Bhattacharya, 2008). The theoretical assumption that prior
impasse is a necessary precondition for Aha! experiences to occur
(Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 2001; Jones, 2003; Öllinger et al.,
2006) is taken up by some (e.g., Schooler et al., 1993; Sandkühler
and Bhattacharya, 2008) and questioned by others (e.g., Bowden
et al., 2005). The conceptual vagueness makes it very difficult
to compare findings across studies, and thus it seems critical to
further elucidate the phenomenology of this special experience
(compare Gick’s call for further research on the affective aspects
of problem solving, Gick and Lockhart, 1995).
The aim of our study was to provide a detailed analysis of
the Aha! experience during sudden moments of insight into
magic tricks. We assumed a multidimensional model where the
interplay of different dimensions establishes the Aha! experience
and assessed the relative importance of the involved components
quantitatively as well as qualitatively. As a basis for this assess-
ment, we identified five dimensions of the Aha! experience that
have been postulated previously:
(1) Suddenness: That insightful solutions are experienced as
very sudden was demonstrated by Metcalfe (Metcalfe, 1986;
Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987) who showed that although prob-
lem solvers are able to accurately judge their progress toward
the solution (recorded as feeling-of-warmth ratings) for
non-insight problems, they are unable to do so for insight
problems. This finding was further confirmed by Davidson
(1995).
(2) Surprise: Based on introspection and informal observation,
Gick and Lockhart (1995) suggested a division of the Aha!
experience in two components: Surprise and suddenness. In
their account, the surprise aspect can vary by strength and
it can be accompanied by either positive (delight) or nega-
tive (chagrin) emotions. In order to disentangle surprise from
these accompanying emotions, we decided to assess the emo-
tional component separately, adding “happiness” as a new
dimension.
(3) Happiness: Because Gick and Lockhart (1995) proposed the
emotional response to vary between the positive and negative
pole, we used a scale with “unpleasant” and “pleasant” as two
extremes. There is also anecdotical evidence for this dimen-
sion of the Aha! experience, for example Gruber (1995) who
analyzed Darwin’s notes from the time of his great discovery
on 28th September, 1838 and from them, inferred “a state of
elevated happiness” (1995, p. 425).
(4) Impasse: Ohlsson postulated that prior impasse is a nec-
essary precondition for Aha! experiences to occur (1992).
An impasse is defined as a state of mind where problem
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solving behavior ceases (Ohlsson, 1992; Öllinger et al., 2008;
Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008). In an eye-movement
study, Knoblich et al. (2001) demonstrated that for successful
solvers of insight problems, the number of long fixation times
(i.e., periods with few eye movements) increases through-
out the problem solving process, with longest fixation times
occurring in the last time interval before the solution. That
is, before insight occurred, there was a phase without system-
atic eye-movement patterns. Their interpretation of such an
“idling” phase was that more appropriate representations can
be established that yield a new insight.
(5) Certainty: Obviousness of solution, i.e., the certainty that an
insightful solution is correct, was stressed as an additional
aspect by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007). This “intuitive
sense of success” related to insightful solutions is also often
described in the context of scientific discoveries (Gick and
Lockhart, 1995, p. 215).
Furthermore, we wanted to test Bowden’s claim (2005) of the use-
fulness of subjective judgments. The differential assessment of
the five dimensions was therefore repeated after 2 weeks to test
their reliability. The present study addressed the following two
hypotheses:
(1) Multidimensionality: We assumed that the Aha! experience is
a syndrome of well-defined characteristics and hypothesized
that all five dimensions are equally important.
(2) Reliability: We tested whether participants’ assessment of
their Aha! experiences would be stable across time and pre-
dicted that they would remember it well, resulting in similar
ratings across time.
The present work focuses on the phenomenology of the Aha!
experience. With the aim of triggering strong Aha! experiences,
we used magic tricks as a problem solving task, assuming that
gaining insight into a magic trick would lead to a strong affective
response since the secret of a magic trick is typically extremely
hard to find out. Further, we have shown previously that magic
tricks are ideally suited to investigate insight because in order to
discover the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome
implicit constraints by restructuring their problem representation
(Danek et al., 2014). This is a crucial aspect common to other
insight problems, too (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 2001). We
also claim that, in contrast to most classical insight problems,
magic tricks are less artificially construed and are more “ecologi-
cally valid” stimuli in the sense that efforts to solve the tricks are
naturally set in motion. When observing a magic trick, people
are astonished and surprised and usually want to find out “how
it was done,” i.e., how the magic effect was achieved. The magi-
cian deeply affects prior knowledge representations, by seemingly
overturning them (e.g., a levitation effect that seems to defy grav-
ity). Consequently, we assume that discovering the secret of a
magic trick results also in an intense Aha! experience, compara-
ble with finding the solution to classical paper-and-pencil tasks
by insight. Most important, and this makes magic tricks superior
to classical insight problems, it is possible to present a large num-
ber of consecutive problems that usually have a high attraction
for the observer, so that we get much more data points than in
classical studies that use only 1–5 insight problems (e.g., Fleck and
Weisberg, 2004).
Previous research implementing magic tricks as stimuli sup-
ports our view: Parris and colleagues investigated the neural
correlates of disbelief by contrasting video clips of magic tricks
with other surprising video clips and found specific activity in the
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Parris et al., 2009). This shows
that there is something special to magic tricks that goes beyond
mere surprise—Parris et al. interpreted this activity as a detec-
tion mechanism for violations of causality which are the essence
of most magic tricks. In another fMRI study to be published in
the same Frontiers research topic (Danek et al., Submitted), we
focused on these violations of causality with a new and larger set
of magic tricks and could replicate some of Parris’ findings. In
addition, we found that the brain activity of the magician who
had performed the tricks clearly differed from the brain activ-
ity of naïve observers. In contrast to lay participants, the trick
apparently did not involve any causality violations for the magi-
cian himself (this can be compared to the scenario of a magician
practicing his gestures in front of a mirror—and no magic effect
takes place). In sum, observing a magic trick seemingly invali-
dates the spectator’s implicit assumptions about what is possible
in the world, and therefore leads to the strong desire to discover
the secret behind the trick. If this is achieved, we assume that the
typical Aha! experience will be triggered.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty students (mean age 24.4; 16 male) participated for 32C
in the study and were tested individually after giving informed
consent. Two participants were excluded because they did not
solve any of the presented tasks, resulting in a final sample size
of 48. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review
Board (Ethics Committee) of the Department of Psychology,
LMUMunich.
TESTING MATERIAL
The testing material consisted of 37 (3 of them used for prac-
tice) video clips of magic tricks that had been performed by a
professional magician (TF) and recorded in a standardized set-
ting. The video clips that ranged from 6 to 80 s were presented on
a 17” computer screen displayed by the Presentation® software
version 12.1. The tricks covered a wide range of different magic
effects (e.g., transposition, restoration, vanish) andmethods (e.g.,
misdirection, gimmicks, optical illusions). The magic tricks were
presented to participants as a problem solving task. See http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B6ZxNROuNw for a sample trick
clip from our study. Stimulus development, a complete list of
the tricks and the experimental rationale are described in further
detail in another paper (Danek et al., 2014).
PROCEDURE
There were two separate testing sessions with exactly 14 days
delay. In session 1, participants’ task was to watch magic tricks
and to find the secret method used by the magician to produce
the magic effect. If a trick was solved, they had to indicate on
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a trial-by-trial basis whether they had experienced an Aha! dur-
ing the solution. After completing all tricks, participants were
asked to evaluate their Aha! experiences. 14 days later, partici-
pants were invited again for a second evaluation of their Aha!
experiences, this time from memory. In addition, a recall of par-
ticipants’ solutions was conducted in session 2. The results of this
recall do not contribute to the present research question and are
thus reported elsewhere (Danek et al., 2013). Both sessions lasted
about 2 h.
Session 1: magic tricks
Participants were seated in a distance of 80 cm in front of a com-
puter screen. After filling in an informed consent, they were orally
instructed by the experimenter to watch the video clips of magic
tricks and think of a solution how the trick could work. If partic-
ipants failed to solve the trick, the video clip was repeated up to
two more times while solving attempts continued.
As soon as they had found a potential solution, partici-
pants were required to press a button which stopped the video
clip and ended the trial. A dialog with the following ques-
tion appeared (all questions in German): Did you experience
an Aha! moment? Participants indicated Yes or No with a
mouse click. Subsequently, they were prompted to type in the
solution on the keyboard and gave a certainty rating of how
confident they felt about the correctness of their solution on
a scale from 0 to 100%. Figure 1 shows the procedure of one
trial.
Following Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s approach (2007), par-
ticipants categorized their solution experiences into insight (with
Aha!) and non-insight (without Aha!) solutions. We used the
following instruction for these judgments (adapted from Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004): “We would like to know whether you
experienced a feeling of insight when you solved a magic trick.
A feeling of insight is a kind of “Aha!” characterized by sudden-
ness and obviousness. Like an enlightenment. You are relatively
confident that your solution is correct without having to check
it. In contrast, you experienced no Aha! if the solution occurs to
you slowly and stepwise, and if you need to check it by watching
the clip once more. As an example, imagine a light bulb that is
switched on all at once in contrast to slowly dimming it up. We
ask for your subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha! experi-
ence or not, there is no right or wrong answer. Just follow your
intuition.”
After three practice trials, the experiment started and for
each participant, a randomized sequence of 34 magic tricks was
presented.
FIGURE 1 | Procedure of one trial. Different phases and timing are displayed. Note that individual tricks vary in length.
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Session 1: assessment of Aha! experience
Adopting a similar procedure fromMacGregor and Cunningham
(2008) who collected a global self-rating of insight after par-
ticipants had worked on several different insight problems, we
decided to conduct the comprehensive assessment after all tasks
were completed. This procedure of asking participants to report
their overall feeling of Aha! allowed us to collect the most basic,
overarching characteristics of the insight experience, independent
from individual fluctuations caused by differences between single
problems (e.g., a very difficult trick in contrast to a less difficult
one that might lead to less strong Aha! experiences). We used a
two-fold approach:
• Self-report (qualitative): participants were given the opportu-
nity to describe the thoughts and emotions that occurred while
they gained insight into the working of a magic trick. This
self-report was performed prior to the rating of importance to
avoid possible transfer effects—so that participants could freely
describe their actual Aha! experience without being influenced
by the given dimensions.
• Rating of importance (quantitative): five previously postu-
lated dimensions were subjected to a rating of importance by
participants (compare Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008).
Session 1: self-report. After completing all 34 magic tricks, partic-
ipants were asked to give introspective self-reports (“Think back
to the Aha! moments that you had during the experiment. For
you, how does an Aha! moment feel like? Please describe it in your
own words!”). It was stressed that the self-reports should refer to
Aha! solutions only, not to the other solutions which participants
had classified as non-insightful. Participants used the keyboard to
type in their descriptions. There was no time limit for this task.
Session 1: rating of importance. Subsequently, participants rated
their Aha! experiences on each dimension separately, using a
visual analog scale. For each dimension, a new scale was dis-
played on the screen (see Figure 2), with specific text on top of
the scale and specific end point denominations (translated from
the German original for the purpose of this paper).
• Please rate your Aha! experiences! unpleasant—pleasant
• Please rate your Aha! experiences! not surprising—surprising
• The solution came to me. . . slowly—quickly
• I felt about the solution. . . uncertain—certain
• Before the Aha! moment I felt. . . in no impasse—in an impasse
These descriptions refer to the dimensions happiness, surprise,
suddenness, certainty, and impasse. As default, the cursor was set
in the middle of the scale and participants moved it along the
scale using the mouse to select a position. The left end of the
scale corresponded to a value of 0 and the right end to a value of
100, but participants did not see any numbers. Participants were
instructed as follows: “Think back to the Aha! moments that you
had during the experiment. Now we ask you to rate them with
regard to different aspects. Please indicate on the scale how much
each aspect applies to your Aha! moments.”
FIGURE 2 | Visual analog scale for the dimension surprise.
To control for familiarity, at the end of session 1 participants
received a questionnaire with a screenshot from each trick and
were asked to indicate whether the solution of a trick had pre-
viously been known to them. These tricks were excluded on an
individual level and handled as missing values (5.2% of all trials).
Session 2: re-assessment of Aha! experience
To control for its stability across time, the same assessment (self-
report and rating of importance) was conducted 14 days later.
The procedure was identical to session 1. Again, participants were
explicitly asked to refer to the Aha! experiences they had had dur-
ing the experiment (now 2 weeks ago) and to describe them from
memory.
RESULTS
RESPONSE CODING AND CATEGORIZATION OF SELF-REPORTS
Participants’ solutions were coded off-line as true or false by two
independent raters, Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of inter-rater
reliability was 0.99. True solutions were identical with the proce-
dure that themagician had actually used. False solutions consisted
of methods that were impossible with respect to the conditions
seen in the video clip. If no solution at all had been suggested, the
tricks were coded as unsolved.
Each participant produced a free report of their subjective Aha!
experiences that was repeated after a 14 day delay. For six par-
ticipants, the second rating was missing. The full statements are
provided as Supplementary Material (translated from German).
The reports were sorted into five main categories (see below). To
avoid any a priori assumptions about the nature of Aha! experi-
ences, the categories were compiled by a rater who was blind to
the experimental rationale, and who based the compilation only
on data from session 1. The rater read all statements from session
1 and collapsed them into meaningful, self-created categories.
This rating scheme was subsequently used by three independent
raters who re-categorized all reports (both session 1 and 2). A cat-
egorization was valid if at least two of the three raters assigned
the same category. Critical ones were discussed until an agree-
ment was reached. Each report could be assigned to more than
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one category, because participants often mentioned several dif-
ferent aspects that belonged to different categories. These were
the categories:
(1) Cognitive aspects
(a) Elaboration (compare representational change theory,
Ohlsson, 1992): A solution is found because a cru-
cial detail is detected. This means, the initial problem
representation is enriched with additional, previously
overlooked details that eventually lead to a solution.
(b) Restructuring (compare Ohlsson, 1992): A new way
of looking at the problem, separate parts suddenly fit
together, everything falls into place.
(2) Emotional aspects
(a) Happiness: feelings of joy, contentment, pleasure, posi-
tive arousal.
(b) Tension release: strain is released, feelings of relaxation
and relief.
(c) Performance-related emotions: pride, drive, increased
motivation, competitiveness, satisfaction.
(3) Somatic reactions: physiological arousal or other reactions
related to the body.
(4) Reproduction of instruction: if participants simply repeated
or paraphrased parts of the instruction that described the
“standard” Aha! experience, this category was assigned,
including the following aspects: Suddenness, rapidness, clar-
ity of solution, certainty about correctness of solution, light
bulb metaphor and common conceptions of Aha! experi-
ences (e.g., “struck by lightning, the penny has dropped”).
(5) Other: rest category
MAGIC TRICKS
Table 1 provides an overview of the problem solving data
obtained in session 1. See Danek et al. (2014) for a detailed analy-
sis of solution rates, solution accuracy, certainty and influence of
demographic variables.
For 41% of all solved magic tricks, participants indicated that
they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. Of
course, the subsequent Aha! assessment referred only to those
events. Participants had been instructed to think back to their
insight experiences, and to rate only those (compare methods).
ASSESSMENT OF Aha! EXPERIENCE
Reliability of Aha! ratings across time (ratings of importance)
There was a delay of 14 days between the first and the second rat-
ing time point. We addressed the reliability of those ratings by
statistically comparing the two time points. For six participants,
the second rating was missing.
Figure 3 shows that the 2nd rating of importance (conducted
in session 2) did not differ substantially from the 1st rating
(session 1). This observation was confirmed by a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with the factors Session (two levels: session 1 and
session 2) and Dimension (five levels: suddenness, surprise, hap-
piness, impasse and certainty) that revealed no significant main
effect for the factor Session [F(1, 41) = 1.1, p = 0.3]. Thus, partic-
ipants’ ratings of their Aha! solution experiences remained stable
across time.
There was a significant main effect for the factor Dimension,
F(4, 164) = 16.43, p < 0.01, indicating that there were differences
between dimensions. We will focus on the two dimensions that
significantly differed from all others, the one with the highest
(happiness) and the lowest (impasse) rating, respectively. Pair-
wise post hoc comparisons revealed that happiness (mean 88.5%)
was rated significantly higher than all other dimensions (all p <
0.05). This means, happiness was the most important aspect of
FIGURE 3 | Comparison of the averaged 1st (circle) and 2nd (triangle)
importance rating for each dimension. For each time point, the mean
rating across participants is depicted. Horizontal bars denote standard
errors of the mean.
Table 1 | Solution rates collapsed into different categories.
Outcome Frequency( = 1632) Percentage of all trials (n = 1632) Percentage of solved trials (n = 800)
Not solved 747 45.8% –
Discarded trials 85 5.2% –
True insight solution (with Aha!) 254 15.6% 31.7%
False insight solution (with Aha!) 75 4.6% 9.4%
}
41.1% insight
True non-insight solution (without Aha!) 263 16.1% 32.9%
False non-insight solution (without Aha!) 208 12.7% 26.0%
}
58.9%
non-insight
Thirty-four tricks × Forty-eight participants yielded a total of 1632 trials. Fifty-one % of them were either not solved or discarded due to familiarity of the trick (see
first two rows) and 49% of all trials were solved (see four last rows). False solutions refer to implausible or even physically impossible solution suggestions.
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the Aha! experience. The feeling of being stuck in an impasse was
in comparison less often reported: Impasse ratings were in gen-
eral lower (mean 60.9%), and differed significantly from all other
dimensions (all p < 0.05).
Analysis of self-reports
Table 2 shows how often the aspects had been described and
provides one prototypical example each.
For the 1st assessment (from session 1), comparing the cogni-
tive and the emotional categories (1a+ 1b vs. 2a+ 2b+ 2c) with
a cross tab, we found that 24 participants mentioned emotional
aspects (but no cognitive ones) whereas only 5 participants men-
tioned cognitive aspects (but no emotional ones). This difference
was significant (McNemar test, p < 0.01).
After 2 weeks, this difference was even more pronounced: In
session 2, 30 participants mentioned emotional, but no cogni-
tive aspects (in contrast to only two participants with the reverse
pattern), and the McNemar test was significant with p < 0.01.
Regarding the emotional categories, clearly the most relevant
aspect was happiness (mentioned 43 times). Performance-related
emotions (24 times) and the feeling of tension release (19 times)
were mentioned less often.
Apart from reproductions of the instruction, which dealt
mainly with the solution strategy used (Aha! vs. more
analytic solving styles), only few cognitive aspects were
mentioned.
Somatic reactions were only mentioned by three participants
at each time point. Two statements were from the same par-
ticipants, i.e., in session 2, two participants described the same
physiological reactions as they had during the first session. In the
first case, this was “a slight pull in my chest and tummy,” and the
second participant expressed the feeling “like a shot through my
body.”
Category 4 was used as a manipulation check. Obviously,
participants remembered the instruction well or used the same
characteristics, with 51 total instances of naming one of these
aspects.
DISCUSSION
The new task domain of magic tricks proved to be well suited to
trigger Aha! experiences with 41% of all solutions classified as
such. This finding provides further evidence for our conception
of magic tricks as an insight task (see Danek et al., 2014). The
comprehensive assessment of solution experiences revealed par-
ticipants’ strong emotional involvement upon gaining insight into
the working of a magic trick. To our knowledge, this emotional
component of insight has not been specifically documented yet
for any other problem solving task. We therefore advocate magic
tricks as useful tools to investigate insight problem solving.
With regard to phenomenology, the present results support
our conception of the Aha! experience as multi-dimensional.
However, the hypothesis that all five dimensions of the Aha!
experience would be rated as equally important was not con-
firmed. Instead, we found “happiness” as prevailing aspect. This
primacy of positive emotions is also reflected in participants’ self-
reports although two different methods were used (qualitative
self-reports and quantitative ratings on a visual analog scale with
fixed dimensions).
The dimension “impasse” appears to be less important than
previously thought (Ohlsson, 1992), casting doubt on the theo-
retical assumption that being in a state of impasse is a prerequisite
for experiencing insight later. This finding is in accordance with
results from a study on the Candle Problem (Duncker, 1945)
by Fleck et al. (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004) who found only few
instances of impasse in verbal protocols obtained during the
solution process. However, this finding might perhaps also be
attributed to characteristics of our new stimulus domain. We
argue that watching a magic trick directly puts the observer in
a state of impasse—namely in the first moment of astonishment
and wonder about the magic effect. At first, the observer is left
Table 2 | Categorization of participants’ self-reports with prototypical examples (translated from German).
# Category Example Frequency in Frequency in Total
session 1 session 2 frequency
1a Cognitive (elaboration) I detected a small detail and suddenly, the things that I had
observed previously make sense.
8 1 9
1b Cognitive (restructuring) What in the beginning didn’t fit together suddenly makes
sense.
6 2 8
2a Emotional (happiness) I am happy and get into a good mood. 20 23 43
2b Emotional (tension release) I feel relieved and relaxed. 8 11 19
2c Emotional
(performance-related
emotions)
- I was much more motivated to continue working on the
task.
- Like a competition between me and the magician, and in
Aha! moments, I felt like the winner.
- I feel so much more intelligent.
12 12 24
3 Somatic reactions Like a shot through my body. 3 3 6
4 Reproduction of instruction I suddenly feel an enlightenment. 29 22 51
5 Other 6 4 10
 92  78  170
Their corresponding frequencies are listed separately for the two time points, as well as summed up (last column).
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completely baffled, without any solution prospect. But later, after
the problem solving process has been initiated, participants don’t
necessarily experience an impasse.
The importance ratings remained stable across time in all five
dimensions (see Figure 2). To evaluate such a fleeting moment
by pinpointing its dimensions on five different scales is arguably
quite a difficult task. It seems impressive that participants were
able to recall their Aha! experience so vividly after 14 days that
they rated it identically. This finding provides empirical support
for Bowden’s claim (2005) for the usefulness and reliability of
self-reports in insight research.
A weakness of the visual analog scale used here is the lack of
negatively poled questions, reflected in the answers’ general trend
toward the positive pole. The temporal stability of the impor-
tance ratingsmight thus partly be explained by reduced variability
caused by this positive bias. An alternative explanation for the
ratings’ stability must also be considered: It is conceivable that
participants did not actually remember their Aha! experiences,
but instead reported what they remembered reporting in session
1. However, this seems unlikely for two reasons: First, participants
had not been informed about what would happen in the second
experimental session—they were completely unaware that the
rating would have to be repeated. Second, to make it difficult to
remember the previous rating, we had deliberately implemented
a visual analog scale without any numbers. There was only a line
on which the cursor had to be positioned. In this way, partici-
pants could never know the value to which the selected position
corresponded and could therefore not retain any numbers, only a
visual image of the scale. It seems unlikely that participants were
able to incidentally retain this visual impression for 2 weeks for
five dimensions, especially when considering the complex word-
ing of the different rating scales (see Section Session 1: rating of
importance).
The free self-reports helped to obtain further information
about problem solvers’ actual experience. A qualitative analysis
of this data revealed positive emotions as the prevailing aspect of
Aha! experiences. These quotes from two of our participants may
serve as an illustration: “A moment of bliss. I am happy and get
into a goodmood.” and “Explosively, the bad feeling of frustration
and confusion turns into a feeling of happiness and I feel a swell of
pride.” (see Supplementary Material). This is in accordance with
results from the importance ratings in which happiness received
the highest value. We thus demonstrated the occurrence of strong
positive emotions during sudden moments of insight.
We found two new aspects in participants’ self-reports. The
comparably high frequency of performance-related aspects (e.g.,
“I feel really clever now” or “With Aha! experiences, I am much
more motivated to continue working on the task or problem”)
has not been reported before. However, it can be assumed that
this aspect is relevant for many problem solving tasks since par-
ticipants’ cognitive abilities are put to the test. Finding a solution
can be experienced either positively or negatively (chagrin about
prior “stupidity,” compare Gick and Lockhart, 1995). The present
data suggests that the majority of participants felt happy about
being able to solve the magic trick, see above. That some par-
ticipants felt a heightened motivation to continue with the task
after an Aha! experience offers many possibilities for interesting
follow-up studies. For example, Aha! experiences could be used
to motivate students in classroom settings.
Although we subsumed them both under the category
“performance-related aspects,” the comments about motivation
and cognitive abilities must be differentiated from comments
about a competition with the magician (e.g., “The magician can’t
fool me anymore because by now, I could do the trick bymyself”).
This was not expected, and at first glance, might be attributed to
the special task situation with our participants being confronted
with the magician as a kind of rival, thus engaging in a competi-
tion with him. However, even if no direct opponent is presented,
a certain flavor of competitiveness is a shared characteristic of all
problem solving experiments. Typically, participants are worried
that their level of intelligence will be assessed or that the experi-
menter will find out that they perform worse compared to other
participants. Thus, they either compete against the experimenter
(who typically knows all the solutions) or against other partic-
ipants. Consequently, if our comprehensive assessment of Aha!
experiences would be conducted with traditional problem solv-
ing tasks, we would expect similar results. Of course, this remains
to be shown in future studies.
Tension release was the other new aspect of the Aha! experi-
ence (e.g., “I feel relieved and relaxed now” or “feeling of relief
after a phase of strain caused by failure”). It seems plausible to
assume that tension arises if there exists no obvious solution
for a problem. During unsuccessful problem solving attempts,
the tension builds up further. If at last, unexpectedly, a solution
is found, the tension will rapidly decline. Apparently, this is an
important aspect still missing from current definitions of the Aha!
experience.
These empirical findings relate to theoretical assumptions
about the phenomenology of the Aha! experience. Ohlsson (1984)
summarized the Gestalt psychologists’ main ideas in a set of prin-
ciples. Some of them overlap with the self-report data: In the
category “performance-related emotions,” participants repeatedly
describe heightened motivation (“I am much more motivated to
continue working on the task”). This closely resembles proposi-
tion N (Ohlsson, 1984, p. 70) in which an “energizing effect on
problem solving behavior” is described. Other aspects also match:
“Recentering as a displacement of attention from one part of the
situation to another [. . . ] reveals what the central part of the sit-
uation really is” (Ohlsson, 1984, p. 70). This corresponds to the
“elaboration” category and matches the idea of selective encoding
(Davidson, 1995), i.e., that a problem solver suddenly detects cer-
tain features which were not obvious before (and not encoded) as
relevant for a solution. For example, one of our participants noted
that “Through a small detail, the entire action sequence becomes
clear.”
We conclude that there is a wealth of information to be
gained through subjective self-reports. Most participants took
several minutes to diligently describe their thoughts, using vivid
and expressive language as documented in the Supplementary
Material. We recommend the use of such direct, qualitative
self-reports as a promising tool to learn more about the
phenomenological aspects of insight problem solving.
Of course, there are obvious limitations to the introspective
method: It is highly subjective, and general conclusions can only
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be drawn with caution. Moreover, it is difficult to clearly deter-
mine what participants actually used as the basis for their report,
especially if several defining aspects of the experience in ques-
tion are mentioned in the instruction, as done in the present
study. Durso even suggested that because participants were shown
to be unable to correctly judge their progress toward a solution
(Metcalfe, 1986), “. . . self-reports following insight are equally
unreliable.” (Durso et al., 1994, p. 94). Yet we argue that for the
elusive phenomenon of insight, subjective Aha! reports might
provide information that would not be accessible through more
rigorous experimental methods. Other researchers have success-
fully used verbal protocols to elucidate the processes during
insight problem solving (Kaplan and Simon, 1990; Dominowski
and Buyer, 2000; Fleck and Weisberg, 2004; see also Fox et al.,
2011, for a recent meta-analysis on verbalization procedures in
general) and others even argue that the rejection of introspec-
tive methods hinders the advancement of the field (Jäkel and
Schreiber, 2013). We suggest that the traditional approach of
using pre-defined “insight problems” and assuming the occur-
rence of insight in the case of a solved problem, without taking
into account participants’ individual problem solving experi-
ences, should always be complemented by subjective measures
(e.g., Aha! self-reports or thinking-out-loud protocols) directly
obtained from participants.
Another limitation of the present study is that we did not col-
lect any ratings on non-insight solutions. On a trial-by-trial basis,
additional ratings would have increased task demands too much
(considering the large number of difficult problems that partic-
ipants had to solve). But a second global rating at the end for
non-insight solutions, too, would have been feasible. This would
have offered the possibility of directly comparing the two types
of solutions and thus would have allowed answering questions
regarding the difference in participants’ subjective experiences
while solving problems with or without insight. Future stud-
ies should incorporate this improved design. However, since the
focus of the present study was on the phenomenology of the
Aha! experience, aiming to disentangle its several components,
we decided not to introduce any ratings on non-insight solu-
tions. Instead, participants concentrated on insight solutions in
all ratings, with the aim of grasping the Aha! experience as fully
as possible.
Critical appraisal of magic tricks as problem solving tasks: We
claimed that magic tricks represent a more authentic task domain
than previous insight tasks because participants start working
on the problem quite naturally, eager to find out the magician’s
secret. During the testing, participants were highly motivated to
solve the presented tricks, even after many trials. In addition,
magic tricks are less artificially construed than classical insight
problems in which participants must solve verbal riddles, logical
brainteasers, mathematical problems or connect dots according
to arbitrary rules. They are authentic because they take place in
familiar situations with ordinary objects like coins or cigarettes.
The present work indicates that such authentic stimuli can be as
valuable as strictly controlled paper-and-pencil tasks. A system-
atic comparison of magic tricks with traditional types of stimuli
(e.g., with regard to motivational aspects) is needed to further
substantiate this claim.
Another open question is how much the findings from the
present study about insight in a magic context will generalize to
other tasks. It is actually a weakness of most problem solving stud-
ies, ours included, that only one type of task is used (but there
are exceptions, e.g., Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987). Attempts at set-
ting up taxonomies of “insight problems” show the large range
and heterogeneity of tasks used (Weisberg, 1995). Future stud-
ies should include different types of problems to allow a direct
comparison of the results across tasks. However, we are confi-
dent to assume that the present findings will generalize to other
insight problems, because, applying the framework of the repre-
sentational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992), it seems obvious that
classical insight problems and magic tricks rely on fairly similar
processes. Both activate self-imposed and over-constrained prob-
lem representations that have to be relaxed in order to come up
with a solution. Our rationale for using magic tricks as an insight
task is explained in detail in Danek et al. (2014). Moreover, we
could already show (Danek et al., 2013) that magic tricks that are
solved by insight had a higher recall rate after 2 weeks, a similar
effect as found with classical insight problems.
Inducing positive mood could be another important advan-
tage of using magic tricks in insight research, because it has
been shown previously that positive affect facilitates insight (Isen
et al., 1987; Bolte et al., 2003; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Sakaki
and Niki, 2011). For example, Isen et al. (1987) induced posi-
tive mood by presenting a comedy film (Gag reel) to participants
shortly before they began working on Duncker’s Candle Problem
(1935). A control group who had watched a neutral film (a math
film, Area under a curve) produced significantly less solutions
than the positive mood group. It seems plausible that in the
present study, participants’ emotional state was positively influ-
enced by watching the magic tricks, similar to watching a comedy
film. The self-reports showed the high emotional impact of solv-
ing a magic trick. Although we did not directly assess mood, it
was obvious that participants liked to watch the tricks and were
highly motivated to do the task. Perhaps the drop-out rate of zero
(for the second visit to the lab) can also be accounted to that.
In pilot studies, participants scored very high on the question
“How much did you like the trick?” with a mean of 2.94 (on a
rating scale from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much). We spec-
ulate that the positive mood induced by watching magic tricks
also facilitated insight in the present study. In future experiments
using magic tricks, we recommend to systematically control
for mood.
In sum, this study demonstrates that the Aha! experience
should not only be regarded as an interesting epiphenomenon
or trial-sorting criterion, but that the phenomenon itself can
be investigated systematically and fruitfully. Implementing magic
tricks as problem solving task, we could show that strong Aha!
experiences can be triggered if a trick is solved. We could at least
partially capture the phenomenology of Aha! by identifying one
prevailing aspect (positive emotions), a new aspect (release of
tension upon gaining insight into a magic trick) and one less
important aspect (impasse). We hope to have contributed to a
deeper understanding of the nature of this complex phenomenon
by introducing magic tricks as a useful research tool for insight
problem solving.
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